









ABSTRACT: Suppose Player A is playing two apparently independent repeated
games with two other people, B and C,w i t hA randomly matched, each period, with
either B or C. Each dyad maintains the maximum incentive-compatible level of co-
o p e r a t i o nw i t h i nt h ed y a d ,e v e ni fc o o p e r a t i o nh a sb r o k e nd o w ni nt h eo t h e rd y a d .
Thus, if A defects against B,s a y ,t h e nC is still willing to cooperate with A to the
maximum incentive-compatible degree. Nevertheless, we show that the simple presence
of each cooperative relationship can increase the maximum incentive compatible level
of cooperation in the other dyad, due to a counterintuitive circular reasoning or “boot-
strapping” eﬀect. With more than two relationships, bootstrapping eﬀects alternate
with equally counterintuitive reverse bootstrapping eﬀects.
* This paper owes a great deal to a conversation with Ron Harstad and Sumali
Conlon. A faculty seminar at the University of Mississippi, as well as discussions with
Mike Belongia, Krishna Ladha, Paul Pecorino, Bill Shughart, George Tolley and Quan
Wen helped to clarify the argument. Support from NSF grant SES-0215631 is also
gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.
11. INTRODUCTION
Suppose Player A is playing two seemingly independent repeated games with two
other people, B and C,w i t hA randomly matched, each period, with either B or C.I ti s
well understood that, if defection in one relationship causes cooperation to completely
break down in the other relationship, then the presence of both relationships supports
c o o p e r a t i o ni ne a c h .F o re x a m p l e ,i fC punishes A whenever A defects against B,t h e n
this clearly gives A a greater incentive to cooperate with B.1
Suppose, however, that each dyad maintains the maximum incentive-compatible
level of cooperation within the dyad, even if cooperation has broken down in the other
dyad. Thus, if A defects against B,s a y ,t h e nC “minds his own business,” and so, is
still willing to cooperate with A to the maximum incentive-compatible degree.2
Suppose also that there is complete information so, if A defects against B,s a y ,
then this reveals nothing to C about A’s type. That is, there are no reputation eﬀects
of the kind studied in Fudenberg and Kreps (1987).3 For example, C reacts to A in
t h es a m ew a yi fs h es e e sB defect against A as if she sees A defect against B.
Thus, the obvious links between the two relationships have been severed. One
would therefore think that the level of cooperation A can achieve with one partner is
unaﬀected by the other relationship. However, this paper shows that the simple pres-
ence of each cooperative relationship can increase the achievable level of cooperation
in the other dyad, even if these obvious links have been eliminated.
The underlying logic, here, is that A’s cooperation with C helps A’s cooperation
with B because her cooperation with B helps her cooperation with C.T h u s ,i fA defects
2against B,t h e nA l o s e st h i se x t r ac o o p e r a t i o nw i t hC.T h i s g i v e s A an additional
incentive to cooperate with B. Similarly, A is more willing to cooperate with C because
her cooperation with C supports her cooperation with B. Thus, the presence of both
relationships creates a counterintuitive circular reasoning or “bootstrapping” eﬀect,
which increases the potential level of cooperation in each relationship.
A second way to understand this bootstrapping eﬀect is that, while each dyad
tries to maintain the maximum incentive compatible level of cooperation, this maxi-
mum level of cooperation depends on whetherc o o p e r a t i o nh a ss u r v i v e di nt h eo t h e r
relationship. Thus, although B and C do not intend to punish defections in the other
relationship, some sort of implicit punishment may be unavoidable.
A third way to think about this is that, if cooperation in both relationships
strengthens each, then A is more willing to cooperate in each relationship in order
to strengthen the other, so cooperation in both relationships does strengthen each.
This bootstrapping eﬀect, however, only exists if the level of cooperation has a
suﬃciently strong eﬀect on the payoﬀ from cooperation compared to the payoﬀ from
cheating.A l s o ,t h ee ﬀect disappears if A can defect against B and C simultaneously.
Finally, with multiple relationships, the bootstrapping eﬀect alternates with an equally
counterintuitive reverse bootstrapping eﬀect as more relationships are added.4
While we focus on this bootstrapping eﬀect primarily in the context of a long run
Player A interacting with long run patient Players B and C,t h es a m ee ﬀect arises more
generally. For example, B and C can each be replaced by highly impatient players,
best responding to A’s expected play in each period.
3This eﬀect does not seem to have been noticed previously. Much work has been
done on cooperation in societies of randomly matched individuals (Rosenthal, 1979,
Kandori, 1992, Ellison, 1994), but these papers focus on cases where cheating in one
relationship causes a complete breakdown of cooperation in other relationships. Next,
Fudenberg and Kreps (1987) focus on reputational spillovers, showing that a “big”
player may be reluctant to concede against one small player in a war of attrition, since
other small players will conclude that the big player is a weak type, and play more
aggressively. Again, bootstrapping does not depend upon such reputation eﬀects.
Third, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) consider multimarket contact between two
ﬁrms and show that, with asymmetry between markets, ﬁrms can use slack in one mar-
ket’s incentive compatibility constraint to enforce greater collusion in the other market.
Bootstrapping does not depend on any such asymmetries. In addition, Bernheim and
Whinston focus on simultaneous defections in both markets. Bootstrapping breaks
down if this is possible (see Section 4). Spagnolo (1999), ﬁnally, considers a multi-
market contact model like Bernheim and Whinston’s, but his ﬁrms are averse to the
intertemporal ﬂuctuations in proﬁts caused by cheating (higher cheating proﬁts today,
lower, noncooperative proﬁts in the future). Multimarket contact then makes cheating
less tempting since it ampliﬁes these intertemporal ﬂuctuations. Bootstrapping does
not depend on any such aversion to intertemporal ﬂuctuations.
If bootstrapping is reﬂected in actual behavior, this may suggest a new way in
which relationships can be aﬀected by their social context, beyond the usual punishment
or reputational channels. Alternatively, one may consider the bootstrapping eﬀect to
4be so counterintuitive that it represents a paradox at the foundations of at least one
plausible model of social capital as a network of repeated interactions.
The next section introduces bootstrapping through a simple numerical example.
Section 3 considers a continuous action space version of the game, and also examines
the eﬀect of moving beyond two dyads. Remaining sections discuss extensions and
limitations. Thus, Section 4 contrasts alternating with simultaneous interactions, and
Section 5 brieﬂy considers reputation. Section 6 concludes.
2. RANDOM MATCHING — A 3 × 3E X A M P L E
This section uses a simple 3 × 3 game to illustrate the bootstrapping eﬀect. It
begins with a numerical example before turning to a more general case. The next
s e c t i o nt h e nc o n s i d e r sac o n t i n u o u sa c t i o ng a m e .
2.1. A Simple Numerical Example
C o n s i d e rt h eg a m ei nF i g u r e1 . H e r eL, M and H represent low, medium and
high levels of cooperation. Note that higher levels of cooperation generate higher
temptations to cheat.5 Also, (L, L) is a dominant strategy Nash equilibrium.
L M H
L 0, 0 60, −10 180, −20
M −10, 60 10, 10 100, 0
H −20, 180 0, 100 20, 20
Figure 1: A stage game with diﬀerent possible levels of cooperation.
5Suppose there are three players, A, B and C.I na n yg i v e np e r i o d ,A is randomly
m a t c h e dw i t he i t h e rB or C, with probability 0.5 each. However, unlike much of the
random matching literature, all players know the outcome of all previous play by other
players.6 Player A then plays the simultaneous move stage game in Figure 1 with
whomever she is matched. Let rA be Player A’s discount rate.
Suppose A treats each relationship in isolation, and cooperation between A and
B,s a y ,a tl e v e l( M, M), is enforced by the optimal trigger punishment strategy of
(L, L)b e t w e e nA and B forever (Abreu, 1988). Player A then plays M if and only if
60 < 10 + 0.5
1
rA
10, or rA < 0.10, (1)
and similarly for B and C. The factor of 0.5 in the second term on the right is needed
because, in any given future period, there is a 50% chance that A will be matched with
t h es a m ep e r s o n ,B. Similarly, cooperation by A at level (H, H)r e q u i r e s
180 < 20 + 0.5
1
rA
20, or rA < 0.0625, (2)
and similarly for B and C.
Now, suppose B’s and C’s discount rates, rB and rC, are both less than 0.0625,
b u tt h a t0 .0625 <r A < 0.10. Thus, B and C are both suﬃciently patient that they
are willing to cooperate at level H if A does. However, if A considers each relationship
in isolation, she is only patient enough to cooperate in each relationship at level M.I s
it possible, in this context, for A to use the fact that she is actually interacting with
both B and C to increase her cooperation with each, even if neither B nor C wants to
punish A for defections against the other? Itt u r n so u tt h a tt h i si sp o s s i b l e .
6To see this, note ﬁrst that, if Player A’s cooperation with one of B or C has broken
down, then A will not be able to cooperate with the other at level H,s i n c erA > 0.0625.
Thus, the maximum sustainable cooperation with the other in this case is (M, M).7
Consider, then, the following trigger strategies: (i) If no one has defected in the
past, everyone cooperates at the level H; (ii) if a defection has occurred in one rela-
tionship, then each chooses the Abreu (1988) optimal punishment, L forever, in that
relationship, and cooperates at the new maximum achievable level, M,i nt h eo t h e r
relationship; and (iii) if defections have occ u r r e di nb o t hr e l a t i o n s h i p s ,t h e ne v e r y o n e
chooses the optimal punishment, L forever, in both relationships.
We want to see whether these strategies form an equilibrium, even though rA >
0.0625, so A would not be able to cooperate at level H with either B or C separately.
Note that these strategies have each player maintaining the maximum possible level of
cooperation in surviving relationships, even if the other relationship has fallen apart.
Is it nevertheless possible for these strategies to maintain A’s cooperation at level H?
T os e et h a ti ti s ,n o t eﬁrst that B and C are very patient, so they are willing to
follow all parts of the strategy. Next, A is willing to follow Part (ii) of the strategy
proﬁle since rA < 0.1. Also, Part (iii) is a static Nash equilibrium, so A is willing
to follow it as well. For Part (i), suppose that A has not yet defected against either
player, and suppose A is currently facing B. Since no one has ever defected, A and B










20, or rA < 0.09375. (3)
This says that the immediate payoﬀ from cheating against B, 180, plus the future
7payoﬀ from reduced cooperation with C, 10 per interaction, is worth less to A than 20
from cooperating with B today plus the future payoﬀ from continued cooperation with
both B and C at level H. The same calculation applies to A’s cooperation with C.
Thus, if rA < 0.09375 (so rA < 0.10 as well), then A is willing to cooperate with
B and C at level H.T h i si st h ec a s ee v e nt h o u g hrA > 0.0625, so A could not have
achieved cooperation at level H with either player in isolation.
This eﬀect arises because cheating in either relationship costs A not only a fu-
ture cooperative payoﬀ of 20 per interaction in that relationship, but also reduces the
maximum achievable cooperative payoﬀ in the other relationship from 20 to 10 per
interaction. Thus, A’s relationship with C,s a y ,s t r e n g t h e n sA’s relationship with B
because, if A defects against B, this hurts A’s relationship with C. This yields a
counterintuitive circular reasoning or “bootstrapping” eﬀect, where each relationship
strengthens the other precisely because the second relationship strengthens the ﬁrst.
A second way to think about this is that, even though B,s a y ,d o e sn o twant
to punish A for defections against C, he is forced to at least implicitly impose some
punishment, since A and B can no longer achieve (H, H) if cooperation with C has
fallen apart. In standard cross-relationship punishments (Kandori, 1992), by contrast,
C completely ceases cooperating with A if A defects against B, so (3) changes to






20, which requires only rA < 0.125. (4)
In addition, (1) is no longer needed, so rA < 0.125 is suﬃcient to support cooperation
at level H. That is, if Players B and C explicitly punish A’s defection against the
other, cooperation is easy to enforce.
8Bootstrapping does not achieve as much cooperation, since it does not involve as
much punishment. However, it does force some implicit punishment since, if A defects
against one of B or C, this reduces her achievable level of cooperation with the other.8
Finally nothing here depends on Players B and C being extremely patient. For
example, suppose B and C are very impatient, and that they are randomly matched
with A i nt h eg a m ei nF i g u r e2 ,w i t hB and C occupying the column role. Since B
and C a r ev e r yi m p a t i e n t ,t h e yb e s tr e s p o n dt ot h ee x p e c t e dp l a yo fA in this game.
L M H
L 0, 10 60, 0 180, 0
M −10, 0 10, 10 100, 0
H −10, 0 0, 0 20, 10
Figure 2: A stage game with Player A choosing rows.
In this case, calculations identical to those above show that, if A ignores her
relationship with C,s a y ,t h e ns h en e e d srA < 0.0625 to support H against B.A n d
again, as long as rA < 0.09375, A can support H against both B and C,s i n c ed e f e c t i n g
to L against one will limit her future play to at best M against the other.
2.2. A General 3 × 3C a s e
This subsection replaces the game in Figure 1 with a general symmetric game with
actions L, M,a n dH and unique Nash equilibrium (L, L). Assume
0=uK(L, L) <u K(M, M) <u K(H, H)f o r K = A, B, C, (5)
9where uK(X, Y)i sP l a y e rK’s payoﬀ function from action proﬁle (X, Y). As before,
L, M and H represent low, medium and high levels of cooperation, respectively. Let
ucoop(X)=uA(X, X),X= M, H, and ∆uch(X)=uA(R(X),X )−uA(X, X), where
R(X)i sA’s best reply to X. Here, ucoop(X) is the payoﬀ from cooperating at level X,
and ∆uch(X)i st h ee x t r ap a y o ﬀ from cheating, as opposed to cooperating, against X.
By symmetry, nothing depends on these being expressed in terms of Player A’s payoﬀs,
rather than B’s or C’s. Calculations similar to those above show that, if A considers










Note that, if higher levels of cooperation are more diﬃcult to achieve, then the right
hand side of (7) will be smaller than the right hand side of (6). This was the case for
the numerical example in Subsection 2.1.
Next, generalizing (3) above shows that, if A takes into account that she is coop-





The bound in (8) exceeds the bound in (7) since 2ucoop(H) − ucoop(M) >u coop(H).
Thus, combining seemingly unrelated repeated games permits cooperation at level H
10for a wider range of rA’s than allowed in (7). The bootstrapping eﬀect therefore
generalizes quite widely.
We could, however, ask a somewhat diﬀerent question. Suppose that the isolated-
play incentive compatibility constraint binds as an equality for cooperation at level M.
Thus, (6) holds as an equality. In this case will bootstrapping allow A to increase her
level of cooperation from M to H? This depends on whether the right hand side of (8)
is bigger than the right hand side of (6), not (7). Thus if, in an isolated relationship,
Player A is just indiﬀerent to cooperating at level M, then bootstrapping allows her














Using ucoop(M)=2 rA∆uch(M) (since (6) holds as an equality), this becomes
∆uch(H) − ∆uch(M) <
1
rA
[ucoop(H) − ucoop(M)]. (9)
This says that cooperative proﬁts must rise suﬃciently quickly, compared to cheating
proﬁt s ,a st h el e v e lo fc o o p e r a t i o nr i s e s .
Thus, if Player A’s incentive compatibility constraint exactly binds at cooperation
level M, then bootstrapping only increases A’s attainable cooperation if (9) holds. A
similar condition is central to the continuous action case considered next.
113. RANDOM MATCHING — CONTINUOUS ACTION SPACE
This section considers a game with a continuum of possible cooperation levels.
Subsection 3.1 considers the two-dyad case, and derives a condition analogous to (9).
Subsection 3.2 generalizes to n dyads, and illustrates a “reverse-bootstrapping” eﬀect.
3.1. The Two Dyad Case
In the one-shot game, assume that players’ strategy sets are the nonnegative real
numbers, x ≥ 0. The single-period utility function for Player A, when playing x
against y by Player K, K = B, C,i suA(x, y), and the payoﬀ function for Player K
is uK(y, x). Assume for speciﬁcity that the game is symmetric. Also, assume that
uA(x, y) is increasing in y and continuously diﬀerentiable.9
Assume the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game is (x∗,y ∗)=( 0 , 0),
so the most severe punishment strategy in the repeated game (Abreu, 1988) is Nash
reversion forever. Also, normalize by uA(0, 0) = uB(0, 0) = uC(0, 0) = 0.
Assume that cooperation involves each player raising x by the same amount, so
ucoop(x)=uJ(x, x),J= A, B, C, (10)
is the payoﬀ from cooperation at level x,w h e r et h ep a y o ﬀ is independent of J by
symmetry. Let R(x) be an optimal one-shot reaction if the other player chooses x,s o
R(x) is what a cheater chooses if the other player is cooperating at level x.T h u s ,
∆uch(x)=uJ(R(x),x ) − ucoop(x),J= A, B, C, (11)
is the extra payoﬀ a player gets from cheating, as opposed to cooperating, when the
o t h e rp l a y e rc o o p e r a t e sa tl e v e lx. Again symmetry implies that this is the same for all
12J = A, B,a n dC. Assume that ucoop(x)a n d∆uch(x) are continuously diﬀerentiable
and increasing in the relevant range.
In the repeated version of the game, Player A is randomly matched, each period,
with either B or C, with equal probabilities. The discount rate for Player A is rA = r,
where we omit the subscript for brevity. Similarly, the discount rates for B and C are
rB and rC. For simplicity assume that rB and rC a r ev e r ys m a l l ,s oP l a y e r sB and C
are so patient that they are always willing to cooperate if A does. This allows us to
focus on the incentives of Player A.
As before, assume that neither B nor C wants to explicitly punish A for defection
against the other. That is, B and C are not “busybodies.” Thus, as long as two players
have never defected against one another, they are willing to cooperate with each other to
the maximum incentive compatible degree, even if cooperation has broken down in the
other relationship. Nevertheless, the maximum level of cooperation in one relationship
might depend on whether cooperation has survived in the other relationship. Thus,
let xB,s a y ,b et h el e v e lo fc o o p e r a t i o nb e t w e e nA and B if A is still cooperating with
C at level xC, and visa versa. Similarly, let x 
B be the level of cooperation between A
and B if cooperation has broken down between A and C, and symmetrically for x 
C.
The players thus play the following trigger strategies: (i) if no one has defected in
the past, everyone cooperates at the level xK,w i t hK = B or C as appropriate, (ii) if
ad e f e c t i o no c c u r r e di no n er e l a t i o n s h i p ,t h e ne a c hc h o o s e sx = 0 in that relationship,
and cooperates at level x 
K (K = B, C) in the other relationship, and (iii) if defection
o c c u r r e di nb o t hr e l a t i o n s h i p s ,e v e r y o n ec h o o s e sx = 0 forever in their relationships.
13We now ﬁnd the maximum possible xB, xC, x 
B,a n dx 
C. First, suppose that
cooperation has only survived between A and one player, K, K = B or C.T h e nA’s








By symmetry, the maximum possible values for x 
K satisfy x 
B = x 






(the superscript (1) indicates that only one relationship is still cooperative). Also, if
x(1) is really a maximum, then the slope of the ∆uch(x) curve should be at least weakly
steeper than the slope of the (1/2r)ucoop(x)c u r v ea tx = x(1) (compare the solid and
dashed curves in Figure 3).
We now turn to A’s incentive-compatibility conditions for xB and xC.T h e s ea r e ,






















Again, at the maximum levels of cooperation, xB and xC are the same, so xB =








14Also, the slope of the ∆uch(x) curve should be at least weakly steeper than the slope
of the (1/r)ucoop(x) − (1/2r)ucoop(x(1))c u r v ea tx = x(2).
Figure 3: Payoﬀs to cheating and cooperation in (13) and (16).
To see that the presence of two seemingly unrelated relationships might allow
increased cooperation in each, note ﬁr s tt h a tt h e∆uch(x) curve, the (1/2r)ucoop(x)
curve and the (1/r)ucoop(x) − (1/2r)ucoop(x(1)) curve all cross at x = x(1) (the ﬁrst
two cross by (13), the second and third cross using a little algebra).
However, the (1/r)ucoop(x) − (1/2r)ucoop(x(1)) curve is twice as steep as the
(1/2r)ucoop(x)c u r v ea tx = x(1). Thus, it is possible for the ∆uch(x) curve to be steeper
than the (1/2r)ucoop(x)c u r v ea tx = x(1),b u tless s t e e pt h a nt h e( 1 /r)ucoop(x) −
(1/2r)ucoop(x(1)) curve (compare the solid and dash-dot curves in Figure 3).
15The (1/r)ucoop(x) − (1/2r)ucoop(x(1))c u r v ei st h e r e f o r ea b o v et h e∆uch(x)c u r v e
in this case, for some values of x greater than x(1) (again see Figure 3). That is, A’s
future beneﬁt from cooperation in this range exceeds her current gain from cheating.
Cooperation by A is therefore incentive compatible for these values of x,s ox(2) >x (1).
Thus, x(2) exceeds the single-dyad cooperation level, x(1), whenever the slope of
(1/r)ucoop(x) − (1/2r)ucoop(x(1))i nx exceeds the slope of ∆uch(x)a tx = x(1),s o








at x = x(1). (17)
Note that this is roughly the continuous-action analogue of (9). It is therefore easy to
construct numerical examples, such as the following.








Also, suppose that rA = r = 0.10. Then the maximum achievable x(1) for each relation-
ship in isolation is x(1) = 4, and, for this x(1), cooperation in the two relationships is
possible for 4 < x<(5+
√
57)/2 ≈ 6.275, so x(2) =( 5+
√
57)/2. Thus, the coexistence
of two seemingly unrelated relationships allows increased cooperation in both.
The logic for this result is the same as that in Section 2. This therefore again
creates a bootstrapping eﬀect where A can increase her cooperation with B because
increased cooperation with B supports increased cooperation with C, while increased
cooperation with C also supports increased cooperation with B.
163.2. The n Dyad Case
Suppose now that A is randomly matched each period with one of Players B1, B2,
..., or Bn, with probability 1/n each. Let x(k) be the maximum possible cooperation if












ucoop(x(k−1)),k=1 , 2, ..., n. (16 )
Now, reasoning as above, if x(1) is truly the maximum achievable level of coopera-
tion with only one dyad cooperating, then the slope of the left hand side of (13 )m u s t
at least weakly exceed the slope of the right hand side. Also, as before,








at x = x(1). (17 )








at x = x(1), (17  )
at which point x(k) will exceed x(1). Thus, with multiple dyads, the likelihood may
increase that the bootstrapping eﬀect will eventually manifest itself.
However, once the bootstrapping point is reached, cooperation levels begin to
alternate in a counterintuitive way. For example, suppose x(2) >x (1).T h e n i t w i l l







ucoop(x(2)), (16  )
17w h e r en o wt h el a s tt e r mi sb i gb e c a u s ex(2) is big. Since the last term is big, it becomes
possible for the right hand side of (16  ) to be less than the left hand side for all x(3) ≥ 0,
so no cooperation is possible at all! Indeed, if we use the functional forms from the
e x a m p l ea tt h ee n do fS u b s e c t i o n3 . 1 ,b u tw i t hn = 3 and r =0 .0666...,t h e nx(1) =4
and x(2) =( 5+
√
57)/2, as before, but x(3) =0 .
The logic in this case is that, if x(3) is not bigger than x(2),t h e nA does not lose
any cooperation with B2 and B3, say, if she defects against B1. But then there is no
bootstrapping eﬀect, so in fact, x(3) is no bigger than x(1).B u t t h e n x(3) <x (2),s o
defecting against B1 actually increases her cooperation with B2 and B3,s ot h e r ei sa
kind of reverse bootstrapping eﬀect, so x(3) <x (1).
Of course, x(4) may then tend to be big again, since defecting against one of four
partners reduces A’s achievable level of cooperation with the other three to x(3),w h i c h
is very low. The x(k) presumably tend to alternate after that.
One could take this reverse bootstrapping eﬀect in either of two ways. On the
one hand, it could be taken as evidence of the fragility of the bootstrapping eﬀect.
Bootstrapping does not build on solid motivational forces like reputation or a desire to
punish defections in other relationships. It may therefore not be surprising that it falls
apart in an equally counterintuitive way. On the other hand, reverse bootstrapping
might reﬂe c tak i n do f“ t h r e e( A, B, C)i sc o m p a n y ,f o u r( A, B1, B2, B3)i sac r o w d ”
eﬀect. Some might ﬁnd this plausible, though I do not currently see how.
184. ALTERNATING VERSUS SIMULTANEOUS INTERACTIONS
Consider again the two dyad case, so the reverse bootstrapping eﬀect from the
previous section is no longer an issue. To see how bootstrapping depends on the
details of the random matching game, this section considers a model where Player A
has deterministically alternating interactions with B and C, and also considers a related
model where A interacts with B and C simultaneously. While the algebra is slightly
more complicated, the basic bootstrapping results are the same in the alternating
interactions case as in the random matching case above. On the other hand, if A can
defect against B and C simultaneously then the bootstrapping eﬀect disappears.
To increase comparability with the simultaneous defection case, we set up the al-
ternations in a somewhat unusual way, though nothing essential depends on the details
of this setup. Thus, assume the same one-shot game and notation as in Subsection
3.1. However, assume now that, in each period, A ﬁrst plays with B,t h e nC sees the
play between A and B,t h e nA plays with C, all in the same period. Then, in the next
period, B sees the outcome of A’s previous play with C, and the process repeats itself.
Again we consider the maximum possible levels of cooperation in each relationship,
conditional on whether cooperation still exists in the other relationship. As in the
previous section, let xK, K = B, C, be the level of cooperation between A and K,
given that the other relationship is still cooperative, and let x 
K, K = B, C,b et h e
level of cooperation between A and K, given that cooperation has broken down in the
other relationship. In the present context, x 































For the same reasons as in Subsection 3.1, the maximum possible xB and xC
can exceed the maximum possible x 
B and x 
C if a condition like (17) holds. The
straightforward details are available upon request.
Suppose however that, in any given period, Player C has to choose her level of
cooperation with A before seeing how Player A played with B. T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
Player A interacting with B and C simultaneously. It is therefore possible for A to
defect against both B and C at the same time. Thus, cooperation on A’s part requires








In this case, the levels of cooperation, xB and xC cannot exceed the maximum possible
x 










20by (22), so xC <x (1) and ucoop(xC) <u coop(x(1)). Thus (20) (with x 





which contradicts (23). Thus, if A can defect against B and C simultaneously, boot-
strapping disappears and seemingly unrelated repeated games really are unrelated.10
This raises the question of how relevant the simultaneous move case is compared
to the alternating move or random matching cases. If opportunities for proﬁtable
defections arise randomly, as in Sobel (1985) or Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), this
may be well approximated by the random matching case, as in Sections 2 and 3.11
Thus, the random matching case may have wide applicability, and the preconditions,
at least, of the bootstrapping eﬀect should be very common.
5. REPUTATION EFFECTS
This section brieﬂy considers reputation eﬀects, in order to more clearly disentangle
bootstrapping from reputation eﬀects. For this purpose, suppose Player A can be one
of two types. Either A is patient,w i t hd i s c o u n tr a t erP,o rs h ei simpatient,w i t h
discount rate rI >r P. The patient type is so much more likely than the impatient
type that, unless Player A actually defects, B and C simply assume that A is patient.
However, if A ever defects against one of B or C, the other concludes that A is
impatient for sure. Thus, letting x
(1)
I be A’s maximum achievable level of cooperation









21Note that, since rI >r P, x
(1)
I is less than the maximum level of cooperation, x
(1)
P ,t h a t
A could achieve in a single relationship if the other player knew she was patient.
Next, let x
(2)
R be Patient A’s maximum achievable level of cooperation with both
B and C, given that reputation is a factor. If Player A is currently cooperating with
both B and C, then defecting against one will lead the other to believe that she is














This equation is illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Payoﬀs to cheating and cooperation in (13R)a n d( 1 6 R).
Here the solid, dashed, and dash-dot curves are as in the no-reputation case in
22Figure 3, where B and C remain convinced that A is patient for sure, even after a
defection by A against one of them. The new curve is the dotted curve, (1/rP)ucoop(x)−
(1/2rP)ucoop(x
(1)
I ), which is the eﬀect on A’s future payoﬀso fc o o p e r a t i n g ,a so p p o s e d





P ,i tf o l l o w st h a tucoop(x
(1)
I ) <u coop(x
(1)
P ), so the dotted curve
in Figure 4 is above the dash-dot curve. Thus, as is clear from the diagram, the amount
of cooperation a patient Player A can achieve with two relationships and reputational
concerns, x
(2)
R , is greater than the amount, x
(2)
P , that she could achieve in the absence
of reputation eﬀects.









R . Note here that, if condition
(17) is not met, then there is no bootstrapping eﬀect, but as long as rI >r P there is
a reputation eﬀect. On the other hand, if (17) is met but rI = rP, the bootstrapping
eﬀe c ti sp r e s e n tb u tt h er e p u t a t i o ne ﬀect is not.
6. CONCLUSION
The environment described here is ubiquitous. There are repeated relationships ev-
erywhere, and people often keep track of their acquaintances’ relationships with other
people. In addition, people often want to continue cooperating with acquaintances,
even if those acquaintances have breakdowns in cooperation with other people. Fi-
nally, opportunities for proﬁtable defections from cooperative relationships may often
arrive randomly, as in Sobel (1985) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), so the random
23matching element of the models in Sections 2, 3 and 5 may also be very widespread.
Thus, the preconditions for the bootstrapping eﬀect are nearly universal. That
said, the eﬀect itself seems quite counterintuitive. If actual economic agents depend
upon common-sense intuition to guide them through strategic interactions, it may not
be easy for ordinary people to stumble across this eﬀect. Thus, while the preconditions
for this eﬀect are almost certainly universal, it is not clear how often the eﬀect itself
actually arises in ordinary economic or social situations.
In addition, it may be diﬃcult to distinguish bootstrapping from reputation ef-
fects (Fudenberg and Kreps, 1987). As with reputation, bootstrapping means that a
defection in one relationship can reduce cooperation in a second relationship, even if
both players in that second relationship want to cooperate as much as possible.12 In
fact, ordinary people may believe they are responding to reputation eﬀects when their
behavior actually reﬂects a combination of reputation and bootstrapping eﬀects.
In any case, if bootstrapping inﬂuences actual behavior, this suggests that coop-
eration between two agents can be aﬀected by the presence of others, beyond the usual
punishment or reputational channels. On the other hand, one may decide that boot-
strapping and reverse bootstrapping eﬀects are so counterintuitive that they simply
represent a paradox at the foundation of plausible models of social capital based on
networks of repeated relationships.
24NOTES
1. This mechanism is important in much of the random matching literature
(Rosenthal, 1979, Ellison, 1994, and especially Kandori, 1992), which assumes that
defection in one relationship leads to complete breakdown of cooperation in others.
2. This is in contrast to the random matching literature mentioned in footnote 1.
It also contrasts with Bernheim and Whinston (1990), who assume that defection in
one market leads to complete breakdown of collusion in others.
3. Recall that reputation eﬀects require incomplete information. Speciﬁcally, there
must be more than one “type” of Player A,w i t hB and C uncertain about the true
type of A. This would allow B and C to learn from A’s behavior whether A was a
trustworthy or an untrustworthy type. Thus, in such a framework, if A defected against
B,s a y ,t h e nC would attach more weight to A being an untrustworthy type.
However, in most of this paper we assume that there is only one type of Player A,
so no such learning is possible. Thus, if A defects against B,t h e nC may conclude that
A simply made a mistake, which reveals nothing to C about A’s type. Since C’s belief
about A’s type would not be aﬀected, C would not expect A’s untrustworthy behavior
to be repeated. Reputation eﬀects are brieﬂy considered in Section 5.
4. This paper does not consider bootstrapping in the context of renegotiation
proof equilibria (Farrell and Maskin, 1989). However, it seems plausible that the eﬀect
will survive in that context. If A defects against B, say, then renegotiation proofness
in the A-B relationship requires A to be punished while B is rewarded. Since A is
being punished in the A-B relationship, this means that the A-B relationship cannot
25deteriorate much more if A then defects in the A-C relationship. Thus, if A is being
punished in the A-B relationship, this continues to weaken the A-C relationship. This
therefore still gives A an additional incentive to cooperate in the A-B relationship.
5. This is therefore consistent with the Cournot case, as is the continuous action
game considered in Section 3.
6. Rosenthal (1979), for example, assumes that each player only sees the previous
choice of the player with whom she is currently matched. Kandori (1992) and Ellison
(1994) consider models in which each player only sees the choices in games in which
she herself participates, and Kandori (1992) also considers a model in which players
get to see a “label” attached to the other player, which depends on the other player’s
previous experiences and actions.
7. Note that it does not matter to the other player why A has ceased cooperating
with the ﬁrst player. For example, suppose A has ceased cooperating with B.T h e n
C does not care whether A had previously defected against B or B had previously
defected against A.T h u s ,A’s reputation is not an issue here.
8. As Quan Wen has pointed out to me, it is possible for both B and C to beneﬁt
from carrying out a punishment if A defects against one of them. This happens if they
use punishments with a renegotiation-proof ﬂavor. For example, if A defects against
B,t h e nB and C could insist that A play H against both for a few periods, while B
and C play L, before returning to (H, H).
This suggests that B and C would not mind punishing A for defections against the
other — they may beneﬁt from being “busybodies.” However, the point of this paper
26is not to ﬁnd the optimal degree of cooperation between A, B,a n dC, but to point out
how A’s relationship with one of B or C may be aﬀected by the other relationship, even
if they are not busybodies, so the obvious links between the relationships are broken.
9. Symmetry and smoothness are assumed for expositional reasons only. Nothing
essential depends on these assumptions.
10. Note that standard Kandori (1992) cross-relationship punishment eﬀects also
tend to disappear in the simultaneous interactions case (see Bernheim and Whinston,
1990). It is therefore not surprising that the bootstrapping eﬀect disappears in this
case as well, since under bootstrapping, players do not even want to punish defections
in others’ relationships.
11. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) also consider a model where the temptation
to cheat alternates randomly between the two markets. However, in their equilibrium,
defection in one market leads to punishment in both, so the bootstrapping eﬀect does
not arise in their equilibrium.
12. Of course, in a reputation context, the level of cooperation between A and C,
say, after A defects against B, will be lower than the level of cooperation between A
and C if B defects against A. Under pure bootstrapping, by contrast, these two levels
of cooperation coincide.
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